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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RITA L. PATE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
MARATHON STEEL COMPANY,
an Arizona corporation,
HENSEL-PHELPS COMPANY,
a Colorado corporation,
and ERICO PRODUCTS, INC.,
an Ohio corporation,

Case No. 20485

Defendants-Respondents.

MARATHON STEEL COMPANY,

BRIEF OF UTAH CHAPTER
AFL-CIO AND UNITED MINE
WORKERS OF AMERICA,
DISTRICT 22, AMICI CURIAE

Third Party Plaintiff,
vs.
PLACERS, INC.,
Third Party Defendant.
The motion of AFL-CIO and United Mine Workers of
America, District 22, to file brief as Amici Curiae having been
granted, the following argument is respectfully presented in
support of Appellant's position that summary judgment was
improperly granted and in support of Amici's position that
statutory employers are not immune from tort liability.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Amici have asked to provide a brief to the Court
because of the importance of what they perceive is the central
issue presented by this case:

the effect of the 1975 Amendment

to Utah Code Ann. §35-1-62 as it relates to tort immunity of
statutory employers pursuant to the worker's compensation
laws.

This case presents a common construction project

situation, i.e., a general contractor contracting with a
subcontractor which in turn contracts with a second tier
subcontractor.

The plaintiff is an employee of the second tier

subcontractor.

The second tier subcontractor had the right to

hire and fire the plaintiff, paid the plaintiff and exercised
the day-to-day control of the plaintiff's activities.
The trial court concluded that the general contractor,
all the subcontractors and all of their employees were fellow
servants.

The trial court could have reached this conclusion

only by applying the law of Utah prior to the 1975 Amendment of
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-62.

The Amici have had a number of their

members involved in third party litigation arising out of
construction and mining injuries in which the courts have
reached varying results from the apparent confusion that has
arisen out of the effect of the 1975 Amendment on this issue.
Amici believe that this case presents the appropriate
opportunity and factual situation for the Court to once and for
all resolve this confusion by ruling that the 1975 Amendment
affords the worker's compensation tort immunity defense only to
the plaintiff's actual employer and to employees, officers and
agents of such employer.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following statutory references are particularly
pertinent to the determination of this case:
-2-

35-1-42. Employers enumerated and
defined — Regularly employed -- Independent
contractors. The following shall constitute
employers subject to the provisions of this
title:

(2)

Where any employer procures any work to
be done wholly or in part for him by a contractor over whose work he retains supervision or control, and such work is a part or
process in the trade or business of the
employer, such contractor, and all persons
employed by him, and all subcontractors
under him, and all persons employed by any
such subcontractors, shall be deemed, within
the meaning of this section, employees of
such original employer. Any person, firm or
corporation engaged in the performance of
work as an independent contractor shall be
deemed an employer within the meaning of
this section. The term "independent contractor," as herein used, is defined to be
any person, association or corporation
engaged in the performance of any work for
another, who, while so engaged, is independent of the employer in all that pertains to
the execution of the work, is not subject to
the rule or control of the employer, is
engaged only in the performance of a definite job or piece of work, and is subordinate to the employer only in effecting a
result in accordance with the employer's
design.
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-42 (Supp. 1983).
35-1-62. Injuries or death caused by
wrongful acts of persons other than
employer, officer, agent, or employee of
said employer -- Rights of employer or
insurance carrier in cause of action -Maintenance of action -- Notice of intention
to proceed against third party -- Right to
maintain action not involving employeeemployer relationship — Disbursement of
proceeds of recovery. When an injury or
-3-

death for which compensation is payable
under this title shall have been caused by
the wrongful act or neglect of a person
other than an employer, officer, agent, or
employee of said employer, the injured
empLoyee, or in case of death his dependents, may claim compensation and the
injured employee or his heirs or personal
representative may also have an action for
damages against such third person. If compensation is claimed and the employer or
insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay
compensation, the employer or insurance
carrier shall become trustee of the cause of
action against the third party and may bring
and maintain the action either in its own
name or in the name of the injured employee,
or his heirs or the personal representative
of the deceased, provided the employer or
carrier may not settle and release the cause
of action without the consent of the commission. Before proceeding against the third
party, the injured employee, or, in case of
death, his heirs, shall give written notice
of such intention to the carrier or other
person obligated for the compensation payments, in order to give such person a reasonable opportunity to enter an appearance
in the proceeding.
For the purposes of this section and
notwithstanding the provisions of section
35-1-42, the injured employee or his heirs
or personal representative may also maintain
an action for damages against subcontractors, general contractors, independent contractors, property owners or their lessees
or assigns, not occupying an employeeemployer relationship with the injured or
deceased employee at the time of his injury
or death.
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62 (Supp. 1983).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Amici concur in the appellant's discussion of the
nature of the case, disposition below and statement of facts.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiff and defendants Marathon Steel Company and
-4-

Hensel-Phelps Company were not "fellow servants" as held by the
trial court.

Summary judgment on that ground was inappropriate.

The interpretation of the lower court's action must be
that one or both of defendants Marathon and Hensel-Phelps were
plaintiff's statutory employer.

Statutory employers are not

entitled to tort immunity by virtue of the exclusive remedy
provisions of the workers' compensation statutes.
Assuming, arguendo, that a statutory employer may
enjoy tort immunity, such immunity is contingent and
conditional.

Immunity in those circumstances could arise only

when the statutory employer is required to and in fact does
provide worker's compensation benefits to the injured employee,
thus expending the quid pro quo for receipt of immunity.
At any rate, whether or not either of these defendants
are plaintiff's statutory employer is a disputed issue of
material fact requiring remand.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE DEFENDANTS HENSEL-PHELPS COMPANY
AND MARATHON STEEL COMPANY ARE NOT
ENTITLED TO TORT IMMUNITY.

The plaintiff, in her first point of argument,
persuasively argues that there are genuine issues of material
fact precluding summary judgment on the issue of whether or not
she and defendants are fellow servants.

The amici do not

address that issue since we believe that the present law does
not provide a fellow servant defense to anyone other than
plaintiff's actual employer and co-employees of that employer.
-5-

The Court's ruling must be interpreted as finding either or
both of these defendants to be plaintiff's statutory employer
and vesting them with immunity on that basis.

As further

elaborated upon below, this is an incorrect interpretation of
the present statutory scheme.
In 1975 the Utah legislature amended Utah Code Ann.
§35-1-62 to eliminate the fellow servant defense except
regarding the plaintiff's actual employer and other employees
of that employer.

Under Utah's original compensation act, an

injured employee was given an option whereby he could claim
compensation from his employer or pursue a civil action.
Laws of Utah 1917, Chapter 100, §72.

See,

This rule was

subsequently altered to allow the injured worker's employer or
insurance carrier to pursue the civil action, if the employee
opted for worker's compensation.
(1943).

Utah Code. Ann. §35-1-53

Later, that section was amended to allow the injured

worker to pursue a civil action against "another person not in
the same employment."

Utah Code Ann. §35-1-62 (1953).

This

last prohibition against suing those "in the same employment"
was a direct descendent of the fellow servant rule which
prevailed at common law.

Peterson v. Fowler, 27 Utah 2d 159,

493 P.2d 997 (1972).
At first only the actual employers and actual
co-employees were immunized from civil suits.

However, a

practice soon developed of general contractors contracting
their work to subscontractors who had no worker's compensation
insurance coverage for their workers as required by the
-6-

worker's compensation law.

Thus, when the subcontractor's

employees were injured and the subcontractor was insolvent,
they had no remedy.

In response to this problem the Utah

legislature enacted Utah Code Ann. §35-1-42 defining statutory
employers.

This provision protected injured workers by making

the contractor responsible for compensation benefits in some
instances if the subcontractor failed to provide benefits or
coverage.
Although the original purpose of Utah Code Ann.
§35-1-42 was to protect workers, it eventually yielded an
unforeseen result.

Subsequent judicial interpretation of this

provision's effect upon the rights of the injured employee to
prosecute civil damage actions under Utah Code Ann. §35-1-62
(1953) altered the statute into an escape hatch through which
tortfeasors could avoid liability to workers of other companies
injured by their negligence.

See, e.g., Adamson v. Okland

Constr. Co., 29 Utah 2d 286, 508 P.2d 805 (1973); and Smith v.
Alfred Brown Co., 493 P.2d 994 (Utah 1972).

The practical

effect of those decisions was to insulate from liability almost
everyone on a construction job on the theory that they were all
in the "same employment" as that was phrase was interpreted.
When this restrictive interpretation of the interplay
between §§ 35-1-42 and 35-1-62 of the worker's compensation act
became apparent, the legislature took steps to correct the
same.

The legislature amended Utah Code Ann. §35-1-62 by

eliminating the prior "same employment" language and by

-7-

specifically providing that the definition of statutory
employer contained in §35-1-42 did not affect the right to
bring third party actions:
When any injury or death for which
compensation is payable under this title shall
have been caused by the wrongful act or neglect
of a person other than an employer, officer,
agent, or employee of said employer
[substituted for "of another person not in the
same employment"], the injured employee, or in
case of death his dependents, may claim
compensation and the injured employee or his
heirs or personal representative may also have
an action for damages against such third
person . . . .
For the purposes of this section and
notwithstanding the provisions of section
35-1-42, the injured employee or his heirs or
personal representative may also maintain an
action for damages against subcontractors,
general contractors, independent contractors,
property owners or their lessees or assigns,
not occupying an employee-employer relationship
with the injured or deceased employee at the
time of his injury or death.
§35-1-62.

(Emphasis added.)

The purpose of this amendment was

to negate the prior case law regarding tort immunity claimed by
statutory employers in third party lawsuits.

The clear intent

of that amendment was to narrow the class of immune persons to
actual employers and the agents and employees of the actual
employer.
This Court has recognized that the 1975 Amendment to
§35-1-62 was a direct response to the decisions in Adamson v.
Okland Constr. Co., 29 Utah 2d 286, 508 P.2d 805 (l n 73) and
Smith v. Alfred Brown Co., 27 Utah 2d 155, 493 P.2d 994
(1972).

In Shupe v. Wasatch Electric Co., 546 P.2d 896 (Utah

1976), while declining to give the 1975 amendments retroactive
-8-

effect, this Court did state that "[t]he amendment if
applicable would leave the plaintiff in court."
898.

546 P.2d at

In Shupe, the survivors of an employee of the general

contractor sued the subcontractor, who defended on the basis
that the general contractor was its statutory employer, thus
rendering it and plaintiff's decedent in the same employment.
Applying the prior statute (referring to "same employment") and
case law developed under it, this Court held that the claim was
barred.

In stating that a different result would have been

reached if the 1975 amendment had been retroactively effective,
this Court recognized that the Utah Legislature's intent in
amending §35-1-62 was to deliberately nullify the effect of
§35-1-42 in cases where an injured worker asserts a tort claim
against a tortfeasor who is not his actual employer.
Since plaintiff's injury occurred in 1980, the statute
as amended in 1975 is applicable.

Plaintiff is barred only

from suing her employer, Placers, Inc., and employees, officers
or agents of Placers, Inc.
by the 1975 Amendment.

This is the result that is mandated

Confusion in the trial courts, however,

has arisen because of language found in Hinds v. Herm Hughes &
Sons, Inc., 577 P.2d 561 (Utah 1978).

There, a landowner

employed a general contractor to erect some silos and
warehouses on his land.

The defendant, Hughes, was employed as

an independent subcontractor to construct a warehouse and other
smaller rooms for the general contractor.

Hughes then

contracted with Hayes Masonry, Hinds' employer, to construct
the masonry walls in the warehouses.
-9-

Hinds was injured while

performing his work as an employee of Hayes masonry.

While the

depositions that had been taken in the case were not published
and were not part of the record, there was apparently some
evidence that a supervisor for Hughes had some right of control
over Hinds in performing the work he was doing when injured.
The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant
Hughes on the basis that plaintiff was in the employ of Hughes
and therefore immune.

On appeal, this Court was hampered by

the lack of a clear statement of facts and the failure to have
published the depositions which had been taken in the case.
This court remanded the case for trial with instructions to
take evidence and to decide whether or not the defendant Hughes
was the employer of the plaintiff Hinds.
Two Justices wrote a dissenting opinion concurring in
the reversal and remand but chiding the majority for not
deciding the critical issue in the case:

whether under the

1975 Amendment an injured party could sue anyone other than his
actual employer.

The majority made no decision other than to

send the case back for a determination as to whether Hughes had
the right to "control the work done by Hinds."

Amici submit

that this is the test for determining whether Hughes was Hinds'
actual employer.

The majority obviously recognized the import

of the 1975 Amendment when it stated

M

[t]his amendment enables

an employee to sue a tortfeasor, not his employer (or the
employer's agents, etc.) even though the injured person and the
tortfeasor may be engaged in the same employment."

-10-

Ld. at 562.

Unfortunately, in the course of the remand the
majority also mentioned the term "statutory employer" giving
birth to subsequent argument in the trial courts that the
majority had in fact held that under the 1975 Amendment a
statutory employer was immune from suit.

It is important in

this regard to note the distinction between an "employer" as
that term is used in §35-1-62 and a "statutory employer" under
§35-1-42.

The test under §35-1-62 requires a determination of

whether or not factors exist showing a traditional common law
employee-employer relationship, i.e. the manner of hiring, the
method of payment, the right to control the employee's work and
the manner in which the employee's duties are carried out.
See, e.g., Graham v. R. Thorne Foundation, 675 P.2d 1196, 1198
(Utah 1984).
The definition of statutory employer under §35-1-42,
however, directs the inquiry specifically to whether or not
there exists three statutory criteria.

They are:

(1) work

procured by one claiming to be the principal employer; (2) who
retains the right to exercise supervision and control over the
manner of execution of the work of the subcontractor; and (3)
which work is a part or process in the trade or business of the
claimed principal employer.

The majority decision in Hinds did

not mention those criteria on remand, but instead remanded for
the sole purpose of deciding whether Hughes had the right of
control over Hinds -- strictly a question of the existence of a
conventional employer-employee relationship.

It can be seen,

therefore, that applying the relevant statutes as amended
-11-

requires the conclusion that statutory employers are not immune
from civil suit; such immunity is now reserved only for the
actual employer and co-employees of the plaintiff.
Here, the evidence shows as a matter of law that the
plaintiff's employer was Placers, Inc., since that was the
entity that hired her, paid her, directed her, controlled her
work and could fire her.

Amici urge this Court to clarify this

issue by ruling that under the 1975 amendment immunity from
third party suit lies only with the actual employer of the
plaintiff and the employees, officers and agents of that
employer.
II.

WERE THE COURT TO CONCLUDE THAT A STATUTORY
EMPLOYER MAY BE IMMUNE FROM TORT LIABILITY,
THAT IMMUNITY AT MOST SHOULD BE CONTINGENT
IMMUNITY.

The purpose of worker's compensation laws is to
protect workers.

It is considered to be a quid pro quo

arrangement; in exchange for the employer's absolute liability
for all injuries sustained in an accident arising during or out
of the course of employment, the employee gives up his common
law right of action.
supra.

See, e.g., Smith v. Alfred Brown Co.,

There is no such give and take between the injured

party and a statutory employer where, as in the instant case,
the actual employer provides worker's compensation benefits.
In such a case the so-called statutory employer seeks to enjoy
tort immunity based upon the worker's compensation exclusive
remedy provision without incurring any liability or obligation

-12-

whatsoever under the worker's compensation act.

Such a

position is unreasonable and unjust.
The Tenth Circuit Court in Thomas v. Farnsworth
Chambers, 286 F.2d 270 (10th Cir. 1960) recognized this
concept.

In Thomas, the Colorado district court had held that

since the principal contractor would be liable to a
subcontractor's injured employee for [worker's] compensation
if the subcontractor failed to carry insurance, then the
employee (who had elected to receive worker's compensation
benefits) could not maintain an action against the principal
contractor for those injuries.

The Tenth Circuit Court, in

reversing the trial court, acknowledged the remedial purposes
of statutory employer provisions:
We know of course that the basic purpose of the
so-called 'statutory employer' provisions in
the worker's compensation acts is to vouchsafe
the Act to all employees coming within their
definitive provisions and to that end to
prevent evasive action by all those engaged in
business or enterprise, within their coverage.
Id. at 273.

The Court went on to point out, however, that

where the principal contractor is not liable for worker's
compensation benefits because the subcontractor has provided
the insurance, the principal contractor is not exempt from
common law liability.

The Court stated:

"[i]n other words,

where the subcontractor has secured compensation for his
employees, a general contractor is under no statutory
liability,

and is subject to common law liability."

286 F.2d

at 272, citing Clark v. Monarch Engineering Company, 248 N.Y.
107, 161 N.E. 436, 438.
-13-

In Fonseca v. Pacific Construction, 513 P.2d 156
(Hawaii 1973), the Hawaii court refused to allow a general
contractor to escape liability by hiding behind the exclusive
remedy provision where no worker's compensation obligation had
been assumed by or imposed upon it.

As the Hawaii court

pointed out:
On the facts presented by this case, the
necessary work relationship for third-party
immunity is absent or, put another way, there
is no quid pro quo. Under the statute as we
have construed it, the relationship comes into
existence only when a subcontractor fails to
provide benefits.

Therefore the appellees [general contractors],
having given nothing, cannot expect complete
immunity.
Id. at 159.

(Emphasis added.)

The Hawaii Court reaffirmed Fonseca in Jordan v. Rita,
670 P.2d 457 (Hawaii 1983).

In that case, the subcontractor

failed to obtain worker's compensation insurance.

The general

contractor, therefore, provided coverage for the
subcontractor's injured employee pursuant to statute.

The

Court reasoned that since the general contractor had sustained
the burden of providing compensation, it was entitled to the
exclusive remedy defense:
Under the statute as construed in Fonseca
an immunizing relationship "comes into
existence
. . when a subcontractor fails to
provide benefits." _Id. The general contractor
wouLd then be compelled by HRS § 386-1 to
assume an employer's duty to pay compensation
to an injured employee of the subcontractor,
and something would be given in exchange for
the protection from suit afforded by HRS §
386-5.
-14-

Id. at 459.

The Hawaii Court discussed the policy reasons for

refusing to confer immunity when the general contractor had not
provided compensation.

Citing from Fonseca, the Court stated:

The policy considerations involved, the
lack of "evidence that the legislature intended
to make workmen's compensation benefits
representative of full monetary recovery in the
absence of essential prerequisites of coverage
[under the law]," and "the maxim that statutes
abrogating common law rights must be strictly
construed" led us to conclude that "third-party
general contractors are not immune [to
subcontractors' employees' negligence suits]
absent the incidents of a true employeremployee relationship.
Id. at 459.

(Emphasis added).

To decide otherwise would frustrate the salutory
policy of ensuring a remedy for wrongs committed and the
imposition of liability upon a wrongdoer.

Otherwise, simply by

taking care that all contracts with subcontractors required the
subcontractor to cover all worker's compensation obligations,
the statutory employer could avoid all responsibility.
provision of the contract is easily verifiable.

That

Without being

exposed to an obligation to pay worker's compensation benefits,
or even to pay an insurance premium, the statutory employer
could nevertheless enjoy complete immunity from the injured
employee's claims by virtue of the exclusive remedy provision
of Utah Code Ann. §35-l-6Q.
unjust.

Such a result would be manifestly

A general contractor of a construction project,

regarded as a "statutory employer," would have no incentive to
avoid negligent conduct since it would have to pay neither
insurance premiums nor worker's compensation benefits, nor

-15-

would it be liable in tort.

So long as the contractor insisted

that all the subcontractors carried the requisite worker's
compensation insurance, the contractor himself could act in as
negligent or careless a manner imaginable without fear of
reprisal.
If this Court were to hold that statutory employers
may be entitled to immunity, Amici strongly urge that this
Court declare that such immunity arises only when the actual
employer has failed or is unable to provide worker's
compensation benefits and the statutory employer has been
required to and in fact has assumed the responsibility for
providing benefits to the injured worker.

A statutory employer

who has conferred no benefit upon an injured worker should not
be afforded immunity.
Ill.

WHETHER OR NOT EITHER DEFENDANT
HENSEL-PHELPS OR DEFENDANT MARATHON
ARE PLAINTIFF'S STATUTORY EMPLOYER IS
A FACTUAL QUESTION REQUIRING REMAND.

While amici urges this Court to clearly state that
statutory employers are not subject to worker's compensation
act immunity, if this Court were to hold otherwise this case
should still be remanded.

There remain in dispute material

issues of fact regarding whether or not either of these
defendants would be considered plaintiff's statutory employer.
As noted above, three specific criteria must exist for
a statutory employment relationship to arise.

The claimed

principal employer must have procured work to be done by a
contractor; it must have retained supervision and control over
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the manner of execution of the contractor's work; and the work
so procured must be a part or process in the trade or business
of the claimed principal employer.

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-42(2)

(Supp. 1983, relevant portion unmodified since 1975).

See

also, Rustler Lodge v. Industrial Comm'n, 562 P.2d 2271, 228
(Utah 1977); Lee v. Chevron Oil Co., 565 P.2d 1128, 1131 (Utah
1977).

The statutory employer was created to provide worker's

compensation benefit protection to those who, while not engaged
in the traditional employer-employee relationship, are
nevertheless subject to the principal employer's control
regarding the manner of execution of work and are performing
work of a character which ordinarily would be performed by the
principal employer's own employees.

See, e.g., Rustler Lodge,

Id. and Lee, Id.
In the instant case, the issue of statutory employment
does not appear to have been squarely addressed in the court
below.

Thus, there are unresolved issues of material fact

regarding whether or not either Hensel-Phelps or Marathon meet
the criteria as plaintiff's statutory employer.

Should this

Court rule that statutory employers may be entitled to
immunity, this case would nevertheless require remand for
resolution of these factual questions.
CONCLUSION
The "fellow servant" defense has been eliminated from
use by all but plaintiff's actual employer and actual
co-employees.

The trial court's granting summary judgment to

defendants on that ground was therefore improper.
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The summary judgment cannot be sustained by
interpreting the lower court's ruling as having found one or
both of these defendants to be plaintiff's statutory employer,
because statutory employers are not entitled to tort immunity.
Such a finding is inconsistent with the legislature's intent.
Even assuming that a statutory employer may be granted
immunity from tort liability, such immunity must be contingent
upon the statutory employer's having been required, and
actually having undertaken, to provide benefits to the injured
worker.

Since neither defendant herein was required to nor

actually did provide benefits to plaintiff, immunity is
inappropriate and the summary judgment cannot be sustained.
addition, there remain genuine issues of material fact as to
whether or not either defendant may be considered plaintiff's
statutory employer.
Amici respectfully urges this Court to reverse and
remand with instructions to the lower court that these
defendants are not entitled to tort immunity.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th day of June, 1985.
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